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I. THE NORMATIVE AMBITIONS OF THE LIMITs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner attempt to provide a purely "instrumental"
theory of international law. There is some lack of clarity as to exactly what the
instrumentalist position is. However, it includes at least two types of claims,
one descriptive-explanatory, the other normative. The key descriptive-
explanatory claim is that international law is best understood according to a
rational choice model in which states act according to their self-interest. The
instrumental theory, as I understand it, also includes the normative claim (1)
that states have only self-interested reasons to comply with or help create
international law. However, some of what the authors say in chapter 7, as I
shall show below, suggests two additional normative claims: (2) that
individuals have no moral obligation to try to cause their states to comply with
international law as such, and (3) that individuals have no moral obligation to
try to promote the rule of law in international relations by prevailing on their
states to engage with international law in ways that are not purely instrumental,
that is, not simply means for maximizing state interest.
Chapter 7 sets out the authors' views on the moral obligation--or rather
lack of obligation-to comply with international law. In chapter 8 they argue
that the commitment to "strong cosmopolitan state action cannot easily be
reconciled with ... [a] strong commitment to liberal democracy... . "
My focus in this Essay is on Goldsmith and Posner's normative conclusions
in chapters 7 and 8, more specifically on the weakness of the arguments they
offer for them and on the authors' tendency to conflate distinct normative
issues and to equivocate on exactly what their normative conclusions are.
However, my aim is more than criticism; I want to show how an understanding
of the limitations of The Limits of International Law brings to the fore a
question that has hitherto received too little attention: How should those who
embrace a cosmopolitan moral perspective regard international law?
Given that most of the book is devoted to the descriptive-explanatory
project, two questions inevitably arise: Why does the book include the two
normative chapters, and what is the relationship between the descriptive-
explanatory and normative claims?
The first thing to note in this regard is that the descriptive-explanatory
chapters are not wholly non-normative. In these chapters the authors say that
they are "skeptical" of the possibility of multilateral cooperation. This
statement clearly has normative implications. In particular, it suggests that
1 JACK L. GoLDsMITH & EPic A. POsNER, THE LMIrTs OF INTERNATIONALLAW 205 (2005).
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efforts at multilateral cooperation are likely to be futile and that it is therefore
unreasonable to engage in them---unless perhaps there is some strong moral
imperative to do so. The point of the latter qualification is that, although
morality cannot require us to do the impossible ("ought" implies "can"), in
some cases it may require us to attempt to do something that is very unlikely
to succeed, if the moral stakes are high enough. (For example, we might have
a moral obligation to try to rescue a lost hiker, even though we think it is
unlikely he will still be alive, or we may be morally obligated to resist a
genocidal regime, even if we have reason to believe that we are unlikely to
prevail against it.) One connection between the "skeptical" conclusions of the
descriptive-explanatory chapters and the normative claims of chapters 7 and
8 may, then, be this: The former tell us that multilateral cooperation generally,
and in particular the use of international law to achieve multilateral
cooperation, is very unlikely to succeed, while chapter 7 tells us that there is
no moral reason to buck the odds and try to achieve multilateral cooperation
through international law. Chapter 8 proposes that, at least so far as we have
a moral commitment to democracy, we actually have a strong moral reason not
to pursue international cooperation through international law.
In the symposium for which this Essay was written, Goldsmith and Posner
adamantly denied that they have any conscious "normative agenda" in the
book. Whether the authors have a normative agenda--conscious or not-is in
my judgment irrelevant to the evaluation of the book. However, it is not
irrelevant to ask what the normative import of the book is or is likely to be
taken to be. Given that they do not rest content with the descriptive-
explanatory account they offer, but go on to include the two normative
chapters, and imply that an attitude of "skepticism" about international
cooperation through international law is appropriate, if one accepts their
descriptive explanatory account, the book as a whole can be seen as a
justification for a particular normative orientation toward international law.
And given the current political context, it would be naive to think that readers
will not ask whether that normative orientation supports what many take to be
the current U.S. government's policy of treating international law as only of
instrumental value, as something to be complied with when it is in the interest
of the United States to do so, but as having no normative weight at all when it
does not. Without claiming that this book is an attempt to provide an
intellectual basis for Bush administration policy, it is accurate to say that its
normative claims, if valid, would lend support to the view that it is wholly
permissible for the U.S. government to take a purely instrumental stance
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toward international law, and that its citizens do not have a moral obligation
to try to prevent their government from doing so.
II. CONFLATING SEVERAL DISTINCT OBLIGATION ISSUES
Goldsmith and Posner do not distinguish clearly between four quite
different normative questions-but rather proceed as though by answering one
they had answered the others.
(1) Is there a moral obligation to obey international law as such (that is,
to obey a norm simply because it is an international law)?
(2) Do states have content-independent, "epistemic" reasons to comply
with international laws generally? (One has a content-independent reason to
comply with a norm if one has reason to comply with it independently of a
positive evaluation of its content).
(3) Do states have content-independent, "epistemic" reasons to comply
with the rules of some international legal norms?
(4) Is there a moral obligation on the part of individuals to try to cause
their states to promote the rule of law in international affairs and to act
sometimes in ways that do not maximize state interests?
At various points in the discussion in chapter 7, it is clear that the authors
would respond negatively to the first two questions, though they fail to
distinguish between them clearly. Whether they are attempting to provide a
negative answer to the third and fourth questions is unclear. I shall argue that
it is important for them to answer the third and fourth questions negatively,
given the general normative thrust of chapters 7 and 8 taken together, namely,
the view that it is appropriate for both citizens and states to regard
international law as having merely instrumental value. I shall also argue that
the arguments Posner and Goldsmith present in the two normative chapters,
when considered in conjunction with the descriptive-explanatory parts of the
book, fail to establish a negative answer to the third and fourth questions.
A. Is There a Moral Obligation to Comply with International Law as Such?
At times it appears that the goal of chapter 7 is only to show that states
have no moral obligation to comply with international law as such. However,
a good deal of the argument in this chapter explicitly tries to show that
individuals have no moral obligation to try to cause their states to comply with
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all or most international legal norms.2 Consider first the claim about the lack
of obligation on the part of states. To establish this claim Posner and
Goldsmith offer a somewhat patchy appeal to the work of philosophers,
including A. John Simmons, that purports to show that individuals have no
moral obligation to comply with the law as such. They suggest, not
unreasonably, that at present the dominant philosophical view is that there is
no moral obligation to obey the law as such, in other words that the mere fact
that something is a law provides no significant moral reason to comply with it.
They note that the doubts philosophers such as Simmons have about the
capacity of individual consent to ground a moral obligation to comply with law
as such become magnified in regard to the proposal that states have a moral
obligation to comply with international law as such because they have
consented. One obvious problem, as I have noted elsewhere, is that a
considerable portion of international law is not grounded in state consent.3
Let us assume that their analysis is correct so far. The question becomes,
to put it bluntly, "So what?" This question is apropos because, as the
philosophers upon whom the authors draw explicitly say, it is unclear that the
truth of the claim that there is no moral obligation to obey the law as such has
much practical significance. That is why Simmons and others refer to the
claim as "philosophical anarchism." It does not show, for example, that
individuals do not have strong moral obligations to comply with various laws.
Nor should we assume that if most people do not believe that they have a moral
obligation to comply with law as such the legal order will collapse-and
Posner and Goldsmith provide no evidence about attitudes toward law that
would back such a prediction.
The authors have two answers to the "So what?" question. First, they state
that the dominant position among international legal scholars is that states have
a moral obligation to comply with law as such. I am not sure that this is the
dominant position, or even the majority position, among legal scholars at
2 For example, the authors indicate that they are going to try to answer the question of "why
individuals and governments should feel obligated to cause the state to comply with its legal
obligations." GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 189. Similarly, they ask whether "citizens
have a moral obligation to cause the state to comply with its obligations," and go on to rule out
as implausible various bases for saying that they do have such an obligation. Id. at 188. Also,
the authors query whether "members of the public really have an obligation to pressure their
government to maintain adhere to a treaty that could only have disastrous effects for the state and
its citizens .. " Id. at 192.
3 See generally ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004) [hereinafter BUCHANAN, JUSTICE].
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present. But if it is, then the authors are to be commended for joining others
who have already pointed out that this is an error. However, nothing of
interest follows in the text regarding states' or citizens' general normative
stance toward what international law should be. It certainly does not follow
either that there are no content-independent reasons for states to comply with
the rules of certain international legal institutions or that there is no moral
reason for individuals to try to cause their states to promote the rule of law in
international affairs or to act, on occasion, in ways that do not maximize state
interests. Second, Posner and Goldsmith say that:
There is a practical reason why it matters whether states have a
moral obligation to comply with international law [as such].
International law scholars who believe that states have such an
obligation are, as a result, optimistic about the ability of
international law to solve problems of international relations, and
they attribute failures to the poor design of international treaties
and organizations.4
It is not obvious why anyone (international law scholars or otherwise) would
infer from the claim that states have a moral obligation to comply with
international law as such the optimistic conclusion that international law can
solve "problems of international relations" if only treaties are written more
carefully. One might think that the problem is that states have powerful
incentives not to fulfill their obligations. It may be true that if one thought that
states have a moral obligation to comply with international law as such, then
it would be important to establish publicly that a given state has such an
obligation, in order to try to marshal pressure to ensure that it fulfills the
obligation.
In my judgment, however, the question of whether states have a moral
obligation to comply with international law as such is not really the central
question, quite apart from the difficulties of working out a coherent account
of the state as a moral agent, capable of having moral obligations. It may be
the case that states have no obligation to comply with international law as such
and yet it may still be true that the project of promoting the rule of law in
international affairs is morally important and that, in certain areas of
international law, states have content-independent reasons to comply with
international law-that is to comply irrespective of a positive evaluation of the
4 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 203.
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content of the particular laws in question. It is to these other questions that I
now turn. The answers to these questions do have important implications for
how citizens should try to cause their states to act vis A vis international law.
B. Do States Have Content-Independent Reasons to Comply with International
Laws Generally?
Posner and Goldsmith set the stage for this question by referring, without
much explanation, to Joseph Raz's view of authority, saying that "For Raz
(1987), domestic law can have authority on epistemic grounds: the law might
incorporate knowledge not available to citizens."5 Put more accurately, Raz's
view is this: One has content-independent reasons to comply with a norm if the
source of the norm is such that in acting in accordance with the norms it issues
we act better than we would by following reasons that apply directly to us.
6
For example, we have reason to treat the norms of the Department of Motor
Vehicles (traffic laws) as "authoritative," that is, to comply with them
independently of whether we evaluate their content positively, if we do better
by complying with them than with deciding, in each particular case, whether
to drive on the right or the left, etc.
Remarkably, Posner and Goldsmith's consideration of the relevance of
Raz's notion for international law consists of just one sentence: "But, however
plausible this argument may be for domestic law, it is unlikely to be true for
international law."7 This is hardly satisfactory. First of all, Raz denies that
domestic law generally is such that complying with it enables us to act better
than we would by acting on reasons that directly apply to us; his aim is not to
use this conception of authority to show that there is an obligation or even a
reason to comply with all or even most domestic laws. Second, even though
it is no doubt true that states do not have content-independent reasons to
comply with international laws generally (just as individuals do not have
content-independent reasons to comply with domestic laws generally), states
may have content-independent reasons to comply with the norms of some
international legal institutions. This would be the case, for example, where the
institution performs a valuable coordinating function by providing credible
information to states, or supplies more accurate and impartial assessments
5 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 195 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, GOVERNMENT BY
CONSENT (1987)).
6 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OFFREEDOM 35, 53 (1986).
7 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 195.
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regarding compliance with human rights treaties than states could achieve on
their own. Nothing the authors have said so far rules out this possibility, and
there may be a number of international legal institutions that fit this
description. Consequently, Posner and Goldsmith have not established their
central "instrumentalist" claim, if this is understood as the assertion that
whether a state should comply with any particular international legal norm
depends solely on whether doing so would maximize its interests.
Of course, the fact that states have content-independent reasons to comply
with the norms of some international institutions is compatible with the
authors' "instrumentalist" thesis, if "better" (in "enabling the state to act better
than it would if it acted on reasons to apply directly to it") is restricted to better
serving the state's long-term interest. However, the Razian conception of
authority is not limited to reasons of self-interest; its notion of reliance on
institutional rules (independently of a positive evaluation of the content of the
particular rules) as enabling us to "act better" leaves open whether "better"
means only "better serve one's own interest" or "better" should be understood
to accommodate other-regarding values. That is why I included the example
of an international legal institution providing better assessments of human
rights violations. Although Posner and Goldsmith argue in the descriptive-
explanatory chapters of the book that states do generally act solely to
maximize their own interests, they cannot merely assume, in the normative
chapters, that states ought to act only in a way that maximizes self-interest and
then use this assumption to try to argue that a purely instrumental attitude
toward international law is appropriate for citizens or for states. Thus, they
have neither shown that states do not have content-independent reasons to
comply with the norms of some international institutions, nor that when they
do this it is merely an instance of the instrumental value of international law,
where "instrumental" means "valuable for advancing state interests."
C. Do Individuals Have a Moral Obligation to Try to Cause Their States to
Promote the Rule of Law in International Affairs?
Let me briefly recapitulate why I think the authors need to answer this
question negatively. Their descriptive-explanatory account leads them to
conclude that it is appropriate to be "skeptical" about the prospects for
cooperation through international law. Indeed, they claim that the beneficial
developments attributed to international law, such as improvement in the
protection of human rights, are due to factors other than cooperation. In other
words, Goldsmith and Posner try to give us reason to believe that the prospects
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of successful cooperative international action through international law are
very poor. Then, in chapter 7, they try to block the possible rejoinder that even
if the prospects for success are poor, we should try to prevail on our states to
"enter into more treaties," create more international law, etc., because we have
a moral obligation to try to cause our states to promote the rule of law in
international relations, or because we believe that international law can be a
significant instrument for attaining cosmopolitan goals. The point here is that
there are some people who believe in the rule of law and think that they have
a moral obligation to do what they can to help promote it in international
relations. There are also others who believe that international law can play a
significant role in helping to achieve moral progress, whether or not they
attribute this to the notion of the rule of law or not. Because states are still, for
the most part, the creators of international law, both groups will conclude that
they have an obligation to prevail on their states to engage in a
constructive-and not merely instrumental-way, even if they think that the
odds of success are not good, if they believe the potential moral payoff is high
and if they believe that the costs of investing energy in the project of
influencing their states in this way, including the opportunity costs, are not too
high. If Posner and Goldsmith could show that individuals have no moral
obligation to try to cause their states to promote the rule of international
law-or that the commitment to democracy provides a moral reason not to try
to promote it-then they would close this loophole in the argument that
because cooperation under international law is unlikely to succeed, we should
not be concerned if our states take a purely instrumental posture toward
international law. In current political terms, they would have shown that we
should have no objection to what some say the Bush administration policy is,
namely using international law when it furthers our state interests, ignoring it
when it does not.8
8 There are two reasons to think that the authors believe themselves to be establishing a
negative answer to (2) as well. First, they describe their task in the book as advancing an
"instrumental" theory of international law, and they clearly think that their instrumental view has
an important normative component. From a normative point of view, an instrumental theory of
international law is one according to which international law has only instrumental value, and
this presumably means that the proper attitude toward not just individual international laws but
also the enterprise of international law-the attempt to extend the rule of law to international
affairs-is purely instrumental. In other words, notjust compliance with particular international
laws, but the enterprise of international law should be regarded as being valuable only to the
extent that engagement with it furthers state interests. Second, the following passage, at the
beginning of chapter 8, summarizes what Goldsmith and Posner claim to have established in
chapter 7, and this summary refers not just to the proper attitude toward this or that particular
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The main point I want to make is that nothing that Posner and Goldsmith
say in chapter 7 supports the conclusion that the answer to question (4) is
negative. Even if they have shown that states do not have a moral obligation
to comply with international law as such, it does not follow that individuals
have no moral obligation to try to cause their states to promote the rule of law
in international relations or to use international law to promote moral progress
in the world. Nor does the pretty obvious fact that not all areas of international
law have Razian authority support a negative answer to question (4). Whether
the answer to question (4) is negative or affirmative depends upon the
resolution of complex issues concerning the importance of the project of
establishing the rule of law which Posner and Goldsmith do not engage in this
book.
More specifically, the authors do not consider why it is that some people
apparently believe that there are moral reasons to promote the rule of law in
international relations. To put the same point differently: Posner and
Goldsmith indicate no awareness of the moral attractiveness of the ideal of the
rule of law; so it is not surprising that they conclude that there is no moral
obligation to try to promote the rule of law and that international law has only
instrumental value.
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to provide anything approaching a
satisfactory account of what is morally compelling about the ideal of the rule
of law or to show that the rule of law should be promoted not only
domestically, but in international relations as well. Instead, I will only sketch
some of the elements of the ideal of the rule of law that have led some people
to find it morally compelling. Even if I succeed in making a good primafacie
case for why individuals ought to try to promote the rule of law, this would not
be enough to show what a commitment to doing so implies for how we should
try to get our states to act in their foreign relations. For one thing, the best
accounts of the morally compelling features of the ideal of the rule of law are
geared toward what domestic law can be like, as I shall presently show.9 In my
judgment, the most morally compelling features of the ideal of the rule of law
international law but toward the enterprise of international law.
Chapter 7 analyzed a state's moral duty to comply with international law. This
chapter analyzes the state's moral duty to enter into more treaties that would
benefit third-party states, give up sovereignty to institutions which promote
justice such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), and, in general, act on
the basis of global welfare rather than state welfare.
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 205.
9 I am indebted to Jack Goldsmith for prompting me to take this point seriously.
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have to do with the ways in which a legal system can protect individuals'
interests and respect individuals' autonomy; but much of international law
concerns the relations among states and in many cases states do not represent
the interests of some or even most of their citizens. So it is not clear just how
the commitment to the rule of law is to be cashed out in the international arena.
Secondly, and equally importantly, it is crucial not to confuse a commitment
to the rule of law with support for existing law and legal institutions, and this
is especially true in the case of existing international law and existing
international legal institutions-which are extremely defective in many cases
from the standpoint of the ideal of the rule of law.
For example, it seems that some believe that the rule of law in international
affairs requires strict adherence to the principle of "state equality"-that
international law should stringently avoid discriminating among types of
states, at least so far as the most important rights of sovereignty are
concerned.' Robert Keohane and I have argued that this is a mistake, that
those who hold this view are confusing a commitment to the rule of law, that
is, a commitment to lawfulness as a normative ideal, with one particular
feature of the current international legal system. We have argued that under
certain conditions a rule-governed coalition of at least minimally liberal states
would be the appropriate venue for making some especially problematic
decisions concerning the use of force.1 Such an arrangement would violate
the "equality of states" principle in the latter's application to decisions to use
force. Yet it might be better from a moral point of view and a better
approximation of the ideal of the rule of law.12
Before pursuing these complications further, however, let me clarify the
general point that whether individuals have a moral obligation to try to ensure
that institutions promote the rule of law does not depend upon whether they (or
the state) have a moral obligation to comply with law as such. There can be
i Allen Buchanan, Between International Law Fetishism and International Law
Instrumentalism (unpublished paper, on file with the author).
" Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in
HuMANINTARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 130-74 (J.L.
Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003); Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The
Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1
(2004).
2 It is ironic that those who have rejected the proposal for a liberal coalition to make
decisions concerning the use of force almost invariably say that the Security Council is the only
legitimate venue for making such decisions, given that the permanent member veto is a clear
(and, one might add, morally arbitrary) violation of the principle of the "equality of states."
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a moral obligation to promote the rule of law in spite of the fact that there is
no moral obligation to obey any particular law solely because it is the law,
because whether the enterprise of law is morally compelling is independent of
the moral quality of any particular law and indeed independent of the
particular characteristics of a given legal system. Those who believe that there
are moral reasons to engage in the enterprise of law find the ideal of the rule
of law morally compelling, but this does not commit them to the view that the
fact that a norm is an international legal norm creates an obligation to comply
with it.
Here I can only begin to indicate some of the features of the ideal of the
rule of law that are thought to make it morally compelling, drawing heavily on
Lon Fuller's conception of the inner morality of law as well as on H.L.A.
Hart's work. The ideal of the rule of law is usually understood to include
several elements, each of which is only approximated in actual legal systems,
whether domestic or international: (1) laws are to be general, (2) they are to be
relatively stable, thereby making possible and sustaining a framework of
expectations within which individuals can plan their actions, coordinate with
one another, etc., (3) to the extent that law addresses individuals, it should
address them as choosers, as individuals capable of autonomy, and when it
addresses corporations or other collective entities such as states, it should do
so in ways that are compatible with respect for individual autonomy, (4) the
basis of legal determinations is to be principled and deliberative, and the
principles invoked, as well as the deliberative processes themselves, are to be
both public and accessible, (5) the interpretation and administration of law are
to be impartial, (6) all persons are to be equal before the law, (7) although the
law may be ultimately backed by coercion, it is to provide a mode of conflict
resolution that does not rest primarily on power, but on the principled and
inclusive consideration of interests, and (8) over time, the process of principled
deliberation should aid in the establishment of a body of rules that is coherent,
that satisfies the preceding six conditions, and that can serve as a basis for
making future legal determinations.
Given this rudimentary sketch of the ideal of the rule of law, it should be
clear that it bears two intimate connections with justice. First, the ideal of the
rule of law includes some important elements of justice, in particular the
notions of impartiality, nondiscrimination, and respect for persons as
autonomous beings who can give and acceptjustifications for acting. Second,
although the ideal of the rule of law does not exhaust the content of justice, an
institution that does a credible job of approximating the ideal will provide
valuable resources for the pursuit ofjustice more comprehensively understood,
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especially insofar as justice requires protection of every person's most basic
interests and a commitment to oppose discrimination.
Notice that I have not said that justice requires equal consideration of
persons' interests, but only that it requires protection of everyone's basic
interests. This distinction is important, because I want to emphasize that one
can appreciate the moral importance of the rule of law because of its
connections with justice, and therefore recognize that there is a moral
obligation to promote the rule of law, without in any way being committed to
the very strong, strictly egalitarian view that everyone's interests-their well-
being as a whole, not just their basic interests-ought to be given equal
consideration. This point will be important when we examine Posner and
Goldsmith's normative claims in chapter 8. Even if they succeed there in
establishing that strong cosmopolitanism is incompatible with democracy, this
will do nothing to show that there is no moral obligation to try to promote the
rule of law, because the ideal of the rule of law does not include the egalitarian
commitments that are distinctive characteristics of strong cosmopolitanism.
I have suggested that the morally compelling character of the ideal of the
rule of law is most easily grasped in its application to systems of law that take
individuals to be the primary addressees of legal claims, and that it is therefore
more difficult to ascertain what the ideal of the rule of law demands in the case
of international law, given that the primary addressees of international law are
states, not persons. Nevertheless, some of the elements of the ideal, such as
generality and impartiality, as well as the notion that legal determinations
should be made through publicly accessible, deliberative processes, and should
contribute to the development of a consistent, coherent body of rules, apply
directly to international law as well.
It is worth noting that the morally compelling character of the ideal of the
rule of law actually provides a reason for thinking that there can be no moral
obligation to comply with law as such: If an actual law falls far enough short
of the ideal of the rule of law, there may be no moral reason to comply with it
at all, much less a moral reason to comply with it simply because it is law.
According to an even moderately positivist conception of what the law is,
something can be a law and yet depart significantly from the ideal of the rule
of law.
As I have argued elsewhere, a commitment to the rule of law in
international relations may, under certain circumstances, require not only
noncompliance with particular international legal norms, but even the creation
of new institutions that may further weaken some existing international legal
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institutions. 13 Precisely the same is true for domestic laws and domestic legal
institutions. For example, it was respect for the ideal of the rule of law, among
other things, that supported not only voiding many laws created in the Third
Reich, but also restructuring German legal institutions. A commitment to the
rule of law, then, whether in the domestic or international sphere, is not the
same as a commitment to the status quo, especially when the status quo falls
far short of the ideal of the rule of law.
Let me hasten to say that I do not believe that many areas of international
law even approximate the constituent conditions of the ideal of the rule of law.
That is not the point. The point, rather, is that a proper appreciation of the
ideal of the rule of law implies that we have moral reasons to promote the
enterprise of law and that, therefore, it is not the case that international law is
only of instrumental value.
The last statement requires an important qualification: Given the morally
compelling character of the ideal of the rule of law, we have a moral obligation
to promote the rule of law, internationally as well as domestically-unless it
can be shown that the rule of law cannot be approximated to any valuable
extent in international relations, or that the attempt to approximate it would
involve excessive moral costs. Of course, more extreme proponents of the
realist tradition have argued that the rule of law, precisely because it includes
moral elements, cannot be established in international relations, because
international relations are characterized by a massive and insoluble assurance
problem that makes moral behavior irrational and unsustainable. Moreover,
some realists, including Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, have held that the
moral costs of attempting to extend the rule of law to international relations are
excessive. However, in my view and that of many others, the extreme
empirical assumptions on which such a realist view rests are so implausible
that we are not forced to conclude that the attempt to promote the rule of law
in international relations is either futile or morally counterproductive. 4 Be
that as it may, Goldsmith and Posner do not present an extreme realist view,
defend it against its legion critics, and then conclude that the enterprise of
international law is doomed and that, therefore, there can be no moral
obligation to promote the rule of law in international relations (because
"cannot" implies "not ought"). Instead, they simply argue that there is no
moral obligation to obey international laws as such, suggest that international
"3 Allen Buchanan, From Nuremberg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International Legal
Reform, 111 ETHIcs 673 (2001); BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, supra note 3.
14 CHARLES BErrz, POLIrICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999).
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law as a whole does not have authority in Raz's sense, and then erroneously
suggest that individuals have no moral obligation to try to cause their states to
promote the rule of law in international relations.
It should not be surprising that chapter 7 yields only these conclusions,
given that the authors do not engage the issue of what is morally compelling
about the ideal of the rule of law, either in this chapter or anywhere else in the
book. If law generally, including international law, has noninstrumental value,
this is presumably because the enterprise of the rule of law embodies important
moral values and, more specifically, because some of the features of a legal
system both partly embody justice and also make the law a valuable resource
for the pursuit of justice. There is, in fact, a remarkable absence, in Limits of
any appreciation for why some people value the rule of law and why those that
do are likely to find unconvincing the thesis that international law is only
valuable to the extent that it advances the interests of states.
m. CONFUSING DIFFERENT COSMOPOLITANISMS
In chapter 8, Posner and Goldsmith first claim they will argue against
strong cosmopolitanism, which they define on the first page of the chapter as
the very extreme view that states should "act internationally on the basis of
global welfare rather than state welfare."' 5 However, on the very next page,
they claim to have refuted the quite different view that states ought sometimes
to act internationally in ways that do not maximize state welfare. (They say
that the claim that states should perform international acts that do not pass a
cost-benefit test where costs and benefits considered are only those attaching
to that state itself is "misplaced."' 6) Of course, strong cosmopolitanism (the
view that states should pursue global interests rather than their own) and
extreme statism (the view that states should exclusively pursue the
maximization of their interests) are not the only alternatives. There is also a
range of views that are usually called moderate cosmopolitanism, according to
which states may give priority to the interests of their own people, but
nonetheless sometimes ought to act to protect the basic interests of foreigners.
In chapter 8, as with their treatment of the moral obligation to comply with
international law in chapter 7, the authors' arguments are plausible only
against the more extreme, already heavily criticized strong cosmopolitan view,
15 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 205.
16 Id. at 206.
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and are entirely ineffective against the more plausible and increasingly widely
held, moderate cosmopolitan position.
Before establishing the latter claim, however, let me note that, although the
chief aim of chapter 8 is to show that strong cosmopolitanism is in "deep
tension" with the commitment to democracy, there is no attempt to clarify
exactly what sort of view strong cosmopolitanism is, and therefore it is
difficult to tell exactly what is being argued for. Unfortunately, the authors do
not avail themselves of some very useful distinctions that have been made in
the burgeoning philosophical literature on cosmopolitan normative theory.
The authors fail, for example, to distinguish between cosmopolitanism as
a moral view and cosmopolitanism as an institutional view. 7
Cosmopolitanism as a moral view is usually described as the claim that every
person is in some fundamental sense of equal moral worth and that,
consequently, fundamental moral status is not dependent on citizenship or
nationality.' 8 As an institutional view, cosmopolitanism is the claim that there
should be a world government or some other sort of all-encompassing
institutional structure in which all persons have equal membership rights.
There are few takers these days for the institutional view.
Posner and Goldsmith target a view about what states should do; they want
to argue that the claim that states should promote global interests rather than
their own interests is both wrong-headed, because states will never do so
("cannot" implies "not ought"), and because it is in "deep tension with
democracy." There are two ways one might interpret the claim that states
should promote global interests "rather than" their own and hence two ways
to understand what the authors mean by strong cosmopolitanism. Following
the first interpretation, one takes the "rather than" literally: call this utterly
self-abnegating cosmopolitanism, the view that states should disregard their
own interests entirely and only pursue the global good (whatever that might
be). Since nobody seems to hold this view, I will not consider it further.
According to the second interpretation, strong cosmopolitanism is an
impartialist view about how states ought to act: each state should give equal
weight to its own interests (or rather, the interests of its citizens) and to the
interests of every other state (the interests of their citizens).
17 Charles Beitz, International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent
Thought, 51 WORLD POL. 269 (1999).
1s KOK-CHOR TAN, JusTIcE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONAuSM AND
PATRIOTISM 35 (2004).
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For a number of reasons, I and many other contributors to the recent
literature on cosmopolitanism reject the impartialist view and instead embrace
a moderate cosmopolitan view when it comes to our prescriptions for how
citizens should try to get their states to act.'9 Our view is that individuals have
a moral obligation to try to get their states to do more to protect the basic
interests of foreigners who are at risk, but that it is perfectly appropriate for
states to act with partiality toward their own citizens.2° Notice that being a
moderate cosmopolitan in this sense does not mean that one rejects
cosmopolitanism as a moral view; rather, it is because we believe that every
person has fundamental moral worth-that every individual's basic interests
deserve protection-that we hold that a proper appreciation of the state's
rightful priority of its own citizens' welfare should not be confused with the
quite different idea that the only legitimate function of the state is to serve its
own citizens' welfare, which I earlier characterized as extreme statism. Later
I will argue that extreme statism is a very implausible view of legitimate state
functions.
With these distinctions among different kinds of cosmopolitan views in
mind, we can now begin to assess Posner and Goldsmith's claim that it is
wrong to expect states to act in a more cosmopolitan manner than they are
presently doing and hence that it is wrong to hold that citizens have a moral
duty to try to cause their states to do so (because "cannot" implies "not
ought"). It may be true that some (moral) cosmopolitans underestimate the
difficulty of changing states so that they act in more cosmopolitan ways. This
can hardly be said, however, of many human rights activists (some of whom
19 See, e.g., BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 1-232; DAVID MILLER, CrrIzENSHIP AND
NATIONAL IDENTITY 161-79 (2000).
20 Goldsmith and Posner quote only one theorist, Michael Green, who seems to hold that
existing institutions, as they are, rather than individuals, have cosmopolitan moral obligations.
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 207. They then proceed to mischaracterize what some
have called the "institutional turn" in ethics and international affairs, lumping a number of other
theorists together with Green. Contrary to Goldsmith and Posner, the "institutional turn" is not
that cosmopolitans have come to the conclusion that institutions rather than individuals have
obligations to alleviate poverty in other countries; it is that they have come to realize that
significant amelioration of world poverty will require institutional action. Neither Thomas
Pogge nor Martha Nussbaum, to take only two prominent examples, hold the view that
Goldsmith and Posner attribute to Green; yet both are prominent figures in the "institutional
turn." So, because many cosmopolitans do not say that institutions, rather than individuals have
cosmopolitan obligations, a convincing argument against cosmopolitanism cannot focus
exclusively on the question of whether states have cosmopolitan obligations. The key question
is whether individuals have a moral obligation to try to get their states to act in a more
cosmopolitan manner.
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may be strong cosmopolitans in the impartialist sense and some of whom may
be moderate cosmopolitans). They know, from tough experience how hard it
is, and often say as much.
Nevertheless, to enlighten those cosmopolitans who underestimate the
difficulties, the authors correctly point out that there are several considerations
that work against democratic states engaging in costly cosmopolitan action.
The first thing to notice, however, is that, taken together, these factors do not
support the conclusion that states cannot engage in more cosmopolitan action
than they presently do.
For example, Posner and Goldsmith note that it has been argued on the
basis of evolutionary theory that altruism is largely an intragroup phenomenon.
But there is a large gap between the latter claim and the conclusion that states
cannot engage in more cosmopolitan action than at present and that therefore
it is wrong for their citizens to expect them to do so. The difficulty with such
slides from "is" to "cannot" to "not ought" is two-fold.
First, from the standpoint of the simple evolutionary view on which Posner
and Goldsmith rely, it is not just cosmopolitan attitudes that are hard to
explain; the existence of the modem state itself is almost incomprehensible.
In virtually all modem states there are many laws that are designed to provide
benefits for some citizens by taking resources from others, and such laws have
had considerable stability, in spite of the fact that the totality of citizens, the
population of the state, is nothing like the sort of primary group whose
altruistic behavior evolutionary theory is supposed to explain. There seem to
be two possibilities: either (a) the existence and effectiveness of such laws
within the state rely importantly on altruism toward one's fellow citizens or (b)
it is made possible by institutional arrangements in the absence of such
altruism. If (a) is the case, then the big question for Posner and Goldsmith is
this: If individuals' altruism can be extensive enough to encompass hundreds
of millions of people one will never meet and with whom one has virtually no
interaction, simply because they are one's fellow citizens, what reason is there
to believe that altruism's limits happen to coincide with those of current state
borders? If (b) is the case, then Posner and Goldsmith need to explain why
institutional arrangements can compensate for lack of altruism in the case of
states, but not in the case of larger domains.
The authors suggest that within states there are "thicker" forms of
association and that this explains the fact of genuine domestic cooperation and
the existence of domestic laws that are designed to produce results that do not
benefit all but provide special assistance to some. The obvious problem with
this response is that the "thicker" forms of association that exist within states
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typically do not encompass all citizens, but instead only exist among various
subgroups (religions, ethnic groups, classes, etc.). Given how far current
evolutionary theories are from explaining large-scale social cooperation, much
less the modem pluralistic, multi-ethnic, and often multi-national state, it is not
very persuasive to say that evolutionary theory tells us that we cannot expect
any increase in cosmopolitan action. If evolutionary theory comes to be able
to explain the existence of large modem states, it will presumably have to
incorporate a larger and more complex role for institutions than it currently
does. But there is no reason to think that if this is accomplished, the result will
be support for the conclusion that genuine cooperation or other-regarding
sentiments cannot extend across national borders.
Second, there are historical examples of people undertaking what certainly
appear to be cosmopolitan actions even when it is not in their best interest to
do so, and where they succeeded in enlisting large and powerful institutional
resources, including those of the state, to achieve their cosmopolitan ends.
One of the most remarkable is the movement first to stop the trans-Atlantic
slave trade and then to abolish slavery. Individuals who largely objected to
slavery on moral-religious grounds succeeded in creating a highly organized,
politically savvy mass movement that eventually won over the British
government and enlisted the force of the British navy.2' A significant feature
of anti-slavery political discourse was the insistence that African slaves were
moral equals, when it came to the protection of their basic interests, or at least
their interest in liberty. Few abolitionists if any were egalitarians; the vast
majority were probably better characterized as moderate cosmopolitans.
In response to this apparent counterexample, one might try to save the
hypothesis that altruism is exclusively or primarily an intragroup phenomenon
by saying that antislavery agitators succeeded in convincing people that
African slaves were members of our own group, namely, humanity-recall the
popular antislavery medal that depicted an African in chains, with the
inscription, "Am I not a man and a brother?" But of course this would be a
Pyrrhic victory, since adopting the thesis that altruism exists only within
groups is vacuous if humanity counts as a group. The point is that it is one
2 See, e.g., ADAM HOCHSCHRLD, BURY THE CHAINS: PROPHETS AND REBELS IN THE FIGHTTO
FREE AN EMPIRE'S SLAvES (2005). This book makes the case that the abolition of slavery was
generally not thought to be in Britain's interest at the beginning of the movement and that the
cost of using the British navy (which was otherwise heavily occupied with fighting in the
Napoleonic Wars) to destroy the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the cost to the Empire of
abolishing slavery in the West Indies (due to an anticipated decline in profits from sugar
production) were thought to be quite high at the time.
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thing to say that our evolutionary past or something else about our psychology
creates obstacles to cosmopolitan sentiment and action, but quite another to
draw the shamelessly convenient conclusion that we are already at the limit
and that the limit cannot be moved outward.
The closest that Goldsmith and Posner come to arguing that we are already
in fact at the psychological limits of altruism occurs in an instance of the
rhetorical strategy of bait and switch, as when they say they will criticize an
interesting position that they ascribe to prominent theorists and then attack a
quite different, less plausible position that the theorists they cite do not hold.
They mention Martha Nussbaum as a contemporary cosmopolitan who
explores the possibility that a broadly humanistic education (along with
modem electronic media and the greater interaction that globalization
facilitates) can extend our sentiments to people we formerly regarded as alien.
But then they quickly characterize this kind of view, quite dismissively, as
"perfectibilist."22 This, of course, is a serious misuse of the term; to believe
that people can become more cosmopolitan than they presently are is not to
affirm the perfectibility of man. Here the authors substitute pejorative rhetoric
for argument, falsely implying that anyone who favors more cosmopolitan
education is a (wide-eyed) perfectibilist.
It is crucial to understand where the burden of argument lies in this
instance. Goldsmith and Posner are advancing the very strong thesis that we
are presently at the limit, motivationally and institutionally, of cosmopolitan
action. Setting out a list of factors that tend to make it more difficult to engage
in cosmopolitan action than in self-interested action, other things being equal,
is a far cry from establishing this very strong thesis.
For example, the authors assert that the people of the United States are not
willing to expend wealth and lives for humanitarian intervention, without even
considering recent empirical literature on the subject.23 That literature is
complex and not univocal in its conclusions, but some studies indicate that the
U.S. public will in fact tolerate considerable costs of military interventions,
including humanitarian interventions, under certain conditions that are far from
fanciful. For example, some studies indicate that how many casualties or what
other costs the public will tolerate depends in part upon whether the
respondents think it was right to undertake the intervention and believe that the
goal of the intervention is being successfully pursued.24 Similarly, Goldsmith
22 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 220.
23 Id. at 214.
24 PETER D. FEAVER & CHRISTOPHER GELPI, CHOOSING YouR BATTLES: AMERICAN CIVIL-
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and Posner flatly state that humanitarian interventions have not increased in
recent years. 25 Again, this is an empirical question that requires both careful
definitions (what counts as humanitarian intervention?) and recourse to data,
neither of which the authors even begin to provide. Without engaging this
complex issue, one can say, however, that U.N.-sanctioned interventions that
have been justified on humanitarian grounds increased significantly in the
1990s, including interventions in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, East Timor, and
Kosovo. To summarize, the first part of chapter 8, the attempt to show that we
should not expect any increase in cosmopolitan action on the part of states, is
analytically confused (because it fails to distinguish between whether there are
limits to altruism and whether we have reason to believe we have reached the
limits), rhetorically disingenuous (because it portrays progress as perfection),
and empirically weak (because it fails to engage the relevant empirical
literature and instead merely asserts controversial sweeping generalizations,
whose key terms, such as "humanitarian intervention," are left wholly
unspecified).
IV. WHY THE COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY SUPPORTS
COSMOPOLITANISM
The second part of chapter 8 attempts to show that there is a "deep tension"
between strong cosmopolitanism and the commitment to democracy. Once
again we must ask: What is strong cosmopolitanism? If it is the impartialist
view that individuals should try to get their states to act so as to count equally
the interests of their own citizens and those of citizens of other states, then I
agree with the authors that it is highly unlikely that most citizens will in fact
recognize or act on this putative obligation. But, contrary to what Posner and
Goldsmith say, this does not show that citizens should not try to get their states
to act in a more cosmopolitan manner than they are doing now. If, as I have
suggested, the more plausible form of cosmopolitanism is moderate
cosmopolitanism, then the more interesting question to ask is whether
moderate cosmopolitanism is "in tension" with the commitment to democracy.
My conclusion will be that moderate cosmopolitanism is not in tension with
democracy as a matter of principle or theory. I think this point is worth
MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE (2005); Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver &
Jason Reifler, Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq, 30 INT'L SECURITY 7
(2006).
25 GoLDsMrrH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 220.
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making, because, although Posner and Goldsmith say they are trying to show
how problematic strong cosmopolitanism is for those committed to democracy,
at times they seem to be rejecting moderate cosmopolitanism, for example,
when they say that it is wrong for citizens of a democracy to expect their states
to act in a more cosmopolitan manner than they do now, by ratifying more
international treaties that serve the interests of foreigners, supporting the
International Criminal Court, etc.
Before we proceed further, it is important to understand that even if it is
true that there is a tension between the commitment to democracy and the
commitment to moderate cosmopolitanism, it is not clear what follows from
this. In particular, it does not follow that the citizens of a democracy should
not try to get their governments to act in a more cosmopolitan manner than
they presently do; nor does it even follow that government officials in a
democracy should absolutely refrain from cosmopolitan action unless
authorized to do so by the public. After all, there are lots of tensions in
democracies: between individual autonomy and the common good, between
the right to freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial, between the
commitment to stable property rights and the need to rectify past injustices, for
example. Furthermore, one should not assume that it is never morally
permissible for state leaders to act without authorization, if the action in
question would further an important moral goal or, more plausibly, avert a
human catastrophe.
The tension the authors want to call to our attention exists, they believe, at
both the institutional level and the level of theory or principle. With regard to
the former level, they mention several institutional obstacles to the U.S.
government taking cosmopolitan action. The most important obstacle, they
contend, is the overarching requirement that "foreign policy must be justified
on terms acceptable to voters [or, rather, to the majority of them]." 26 Because
Posner and Goldsmith believe that cosmopolitan sentiments are "weak" among
American voters (and other democratic publics), they believe that this is a
serious obstacle. As to how "serious" they think it is, that is unclear. The
authors' statement, cited above, that it is a mistake to expect states to act in a
more cosmopolitan fashion than they presently do, suggests that they think it
is an insurmountable obstacle. They first present certain institutional features
as serious obstacles, but then slide toward the unwarranted conclusion that
they are insurmountable obstacles.
26 Id. at 212.
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Part of the problem, as I noted earlier, is that they remain content to operate
with the very vague, undifferentiated notion of "cosmopolitan sentiment,"
neither drawing on empirical work to try to determine the conditions under
which different kinds of cosmopolitan action may be supported by publics nor
telling us what counts as "weak" in this context. In addition, as I have also
already observed, they too readily dismiss as "perfectibilist" the prospect that
cosmopolitan sentiment might be strengthened, through education and
institutional change. In summary, the authors' discussion of institutional
obstacles to cosmopolitan action does not support the broad claim that it is
very likely to be futile for citizens of a democracy to try to get their
governments to engage in more cosmopolitan action than they now do, so it
does nothing to show that citizens have no moral obligation to pressure their
governments to do so (on the grounds that "cannot" implies "not ought").
Exactly what the tension between democracy and cosmopolitanism derives
from at the level of theory or principle is perhaps not quite so clear. The
following passage suggests that Goldsmith and Posner are uncritically
assuming that any departure from the purpose for which a state was founded
is either unfeasible or illegitimate.
Another crucial difference between a liberal democratic state
and, say, Oxfam International, is that the state does not organize
itself for the purpose of engaging in acts of cosmopolitan charity.
The dominant purpose of any state is to create a community of
mutual benefit for citizens and other members, and more
generally to preserve and enhance the welfare of compatriots.
The U.S. Constitution, for example, was designed to create a
more perfect domestic order, and its foreign relations
mechanisms were crafted to enhance U.S. welfare.27
Notice, first, that the authors' thesis that the "dominant" purpose of any state
is to preserve and enhance the welfare of its own citizens only rules out strong
cosmopolitanism (understood either as the utter self-abnegation or the
impartialist view); it is quite compatible with moderate cosmopolitanism, and
it certainly does not rule out the possibility that states can act in a more
cosmopolitan manner than they currently do and still accord a proper priority
to their own citizens' welfare. Second, and more importantly, the fact that a
state was created for a particular purpose may tell us that there are likely to be
27 Id. at 211.
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institutional obstacles to pursuing other purposes, but it does not show that the
pursuit of other purposes is unfeasible, much less inconsistent in principle or
theory. The United States and other states currently pursue many activities
that were not envisioned by their founders. The question is whether they ought
to. The issue of when institutional goals should be expanded or otherwise
revised is a very important one, but Goldsmith and Posner do not engage it.
To summarize my argument thus far: Posner and Goldsmith have not shown
that it is futile to expect democratic states to engage in more cosmopolitan
action than they do, and they have not shown that moderate cosmopolitanism
is incompatible with democracy in principle or theory. They have, however,
given those cosmopolitans who underestimate the difficulty of getting
democratic states to act in a more cosmopolitan manner good reason to
reconsider their optimism.
I would suggest that there is a theoretical or in-principle tension worth
considering, but that it is a tension between a certain view of democracy that
Posner and Goldsmith may hold and the justifications for democracy. Since
I have developed this line of thought in some detail elsewhere, I will only
sketch it here.28 The core ideas are that the more plausible justifications that
are given for having democratic government rely on universalistic moral
values, and that these universalistic moral values not only impose limits on
majority rule domestically (in the form of entrenched individual rights, for
example), but also give us reason to regard the state as something more than
merely an instrument for our mutual benefit. If this is the case, then there is
something deeply wrong with the assumption that the only legitimate function
of the democratic state is to realize the preferences of its own citizens or to
maximize their welfare. The same reasons that we have for insisting on having
a democratic state also require us to acknowledge that our state should not be
regarded simply as an instrument for realizing our preferences or maximizing
our welfare. Just as the values that undergird democracy justify internal
limitations on democratic policy, in the form of entrenched individual rights
that constrain majority rule, so they also impose limitations on how
democracies should act regarding foreign relations.
Goldsmith and Posner seem to assume a commitment to democracy, while
saying almost nothing about the justifications for democracy. The more
plausiblejustifications for democracy typically fall into two classes: arguments
to show that democracy is the most reliable form of government for
28 Allen Buchanan, The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, 7 J. POL. PHIL.
71 (1999); BUCHANAN, JusTIcE, supra note 3.
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constraining abuses of government power and helping ensure that government
effectively serves the interests of all citizens; and arguments to show that when
individuals are subject to a system of coercively-backed laws, a proper regard
for equality requires that in some sense each must have an "equal say" in
determining what the laws will be. When fleshed out, both types of arguments
appeal to certain morally relevant characteristics that are universal among
people, not possessed exclusively by those who happen to be our fellow
citizens. For example, when we try to spell out why government ought to
serve the welfare of all citizens, we must appeal, ultimately, to the moral
importance of each citizen's basic interests; but in doing so, we will, in the
end, rely on something like the idea that any individual who possesses certain
characteristics is deserving of protection. To take only one example: when
John Locke argues that government is legitimate only when it protects life,
liberty, and property, he appeals to what he takes to be generic features of
human beings-their capacity for rationality in particular. He says they have
these rights because they are men, not because they are Englishmen. If the
basic interests, protection of which justifies the existence of the state and
determines the conditions of its legitimacy, are human interests common to all
persons, then surely a way of thinking about the nature of the state that
provides no basis for obligations to help ensure that the basic interests of all
persons are protected is fundamentally flawed. Similarly, attempts to flesh out
the argument that everyone subject to a system of coercively backed laws
ought to have a say in determining what the laws are must appeal, ultimately,
to a principle of equality or of respect for autonomy that is universal in scope.
It does not follow, of course, that everyone is entitled to participate in some
sort of "world-democracy." But it is hard to see how our commitment to the
values of equality and autonomy that underlie our commitment to democracy
in our own state could have no implications for our conception of the
legitimate functions of the state, given that in our world states are the most
powerful institutional resources we possess for implementing such
fundamental moral values. In brief, the same values that support the
commitment to democracy at least establish a prima facie case for regarding
the state as a resource for implementing those values. But if this is so, then we
cannot simply assume that as a matter of principle democracies are only
legitimately concerned with realizing their own citizens' preferences or
maximizing their interests. And we cannot, therefore, conclude that for this
reason democracy is in tension with cosmopolitan state action as a matter of
principle or theory. Simply to assume such a view of the legitimate functions
of the state-to assume the validity of extreme statism-in an argument
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against cosmopolitanism is to beg the fundamental question at issue. Yet
without this assumption, Posner and Goldsmith's discussion of democracy in
chapter 8 cannot show that cosmopolitanism, at least in moderate forms, and
democracy are in tension as a matter of principle or theory.
I will mention briefly one other reason for rejecting extreme statism, the
view that the only legitimate function of the state is to realize its own citizens'
preferences or to maximize their interests. This view is incompatible with
some very stable and apparently widely held moral intuitions about our
negative moral duties to foreigners. Taken literally, extreme statism implies
that the state ought to undertake an unprovoked attack on another state, if
doing so would serve its citizens' interests, unless the majority of the citizens
happen to disapprove of its doing so. Thus, the view that the state ought only
to act to realize its own citizens' preferences or to maximize their welfare is
in direct conflict with the intuition that it is wrong to harm the innocent and
that it is wrong to engage in aggressive war.
A proponent of this view of the legitimate functions of the state might
attempt to avoid this unsavory implication by saying that the government's
mandate to do only what serves the best interests of its citizens (or realizes the
preferences of the majority of citizens) is limited by a general negative duty
not to harm. The problem is that this move appears to be wholly ad hoc. In
other words, once it is conceded that the state is not properly conceived as
being exclusively an instrument to advance the interests of its citizens (or to
realize their preferences), we must face the question of why our obligations to
foreigners are limited to the duty not to harm. The objection, then, can be
formulated as a dilemma. Either the proponent of this view of the legitimate
functions of the state must stick to it, denying that states have any obligations
whatsoever to foreigners, including negative duties not to kill or injure them
in the pursuit of maximizing their own citizens' interests or realizing the
citizens' preferences; or he must acknowledge that states have such negative
duties, but then face the charge that he provides no basis for not recognizing
some positive duties as well. And note that here, once again, the choice is not
between strong cosmopolitanism, understood as the extreme view that we
ought to treat the interests of foreigners as equal to ours, on the one hand, and
rejecting positive duties to foreigners altogether, on the other. A third, more
reasonable alternative is that we have some positive duties to foreigners, and
that our conception of legitimate state functions should take this into account.
I conclude that Posner and Goldsmith have not shown that there is a "deep
tension" between democracy and moderate cosmopolitanism as a matter of
principle or theory, and that they have given us no reason to think that the
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institutional obstacles that they describe preclude a significant increase in
cosmopolitan action relative to the status quo. I have also argued that the
commitment to democracy in fact pushes us toward, not away from
cosmopolitanism, insofar as the most plausible justifications for democracy
rely on premises about the equal fundamental moral worth of all persons.
If the authors reply that their only aim was to show that there is a tension
between democracy and strong cosmopolitanism, then two points are apropos.
First, as I have already emphasized, by restricting their argument to an attack
on strong cosmopolitanism, the authors would fail to engage what may now be
the dominant type of cosmopolitan view-moderate cosmopolitanism.
Second, restricting their attack to strong cosmopolitanism fails to support their
central contention that we should not expect democracies to develop more
cosmopolitan policies.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Limits ofInternational Law advances a number of provocative theses.
Given the political context in which it occurs-and given the intellectual
debate about international law that the current political context has
stimulated-it is appropriate to ask not only whether the book succeeds in its
intellectual aims, but also whether those aims, if attained, would lend support
to the present posture of the U.S. government regarding international law.
The authors do argue that it is a mistake for U.S. citizens to expect their
state to act in a more cosmopolitan manner. They also argue that the proper
attitude toward international law-the only reasonable attitude, given their
theory of how international law works-is purely instrumental, that
international law is valuable only to the extent that it serves state interests.
Finally, Posner and Goldsmith also suggest that there is some sort of
incompatibility in principle between cosmopolitan commitments-at least
serious ones-and the commitment to democracy. If all of these theses were
true, then current U.S. policies that disregard certain fundamental international
legal norms, including those prohibiting torture and the rendition of prisoners
to countries where they will be tortured, would be more defensible than they
are. This is not to say that the fact that the authors advance these theses shows
that they support the policies in question. There are good moral and prudential
arguments against such policies that are quite independent of the issue of what
the proper posture toward international law is, and endorsing these arguments
may be compatible with everything the authors say in Limits. Nevertheless,
given the political context, it is important to understand that Posner and
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Goldsmith do not succeed in establishing any of the foregoing theses and that,
therefore, those who believe that this book provides support for the policies in
question are mistaken.
Nonetheless, in the normative chapters of their book, Posner and Goldsmith
have succeeded in performing two commendable services: they have helped to
make clear the magnitude of the political task facing those who regard the
democratic state as a valuable resource for realizing cosmopolitan principles,
and they have challenged those who are committed to the rule of law in
international relations to articulate more clearly the basis and nature of that
commitment.
